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Boards of Directors as an 
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ost organizations are governed by a board of directors. 
In fact, having a board is one of the legal requirements 
for incorporation. Many nonincorporated entities also have a 
governing board of some sort, such as a state university’s 
board of regents. Given the myriad boards in place today, it 
is reasonable to ask, Why do they exist? What do they do? 
Can they be “improved”? These questions are at the heart of 
governance and, to a certain extent, management. As such, 
they have motivated much of the research on this topic. 
This paper surveys the research on boards of directors in the 
economics and finance literature. Boards of directors are an 
economic institution that, in theory, helps to solve the agency 
problems inherent in managing an organization. Although 
boards satisfy numerous regulatory requirements, their 
economic function is determined by the organizational 
problems they help to address. Yet formal economic theory on 
boards has been quite limited. For example, the characteristics 
of agency problems that could lead to boards being the 
equilibrium solution have not yet been specified. Similarly, the 
conditions under which regulation of boards will lead to 
improvements are unknown.
Despite the absence of formal theory, we have a strong 
intuitive sense of the problems facing boards. A major conflict 
within the boardroom is between the CEO and the directors. 
The CEO has incentives to “capture” the board, so as to ensure 
that he can keep his job and increase the other benefits he 
derives from being CEO. Directors have incentives to maintain 
their independence, to monitor the CEO, and to replace the 
CEO if his performance is poor. 
To some extent, the vacuum in formal theory has been filled 
by empirical work on boards. The “cost” associated with this 
approach, however, is that little of the empirical work on 
boards has been motivated by formal theory. Rather, it has 
sought to answer one of three questions: 
1. How do board characteristics such as composition or size 
affect profitability?
2. How do board characteristics affect the observable actions 
of the board?
3. What factors affect the makeup of boards and how do they 
evolve over time?
A key issue in this empirical work is how to proxy for the 
board’s degree of independence from the CEO. Much of this 
work starts from the sometimes implicit assumption that 
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Other factors (such
as the CEO’s previous 
performance)
observable board characteristics such as size or composition 
are related to the level of board independence.1
Research thus far has established a number of empirical 
regularities. First, board composition, as measured by the 
insider-outsider ratio,2 is not correlated with firm 
performance.3 However, the number of directors on a firm’s 
board is negatively related to the firm’s financial performance. 
Second, board actions do appear to be related to board 
characteristics. Firms with higher proportions of outside 
directors and smaller boards tend to make arguably better—or 
at least different—decisions concerning acquisitions, poison 
pills, executive compensation, and CEO replacement, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, boards appear to evolve over time depending 
on the bargaining position of the CEO relative to that of the 
existing directors. Firm performance, CEO turnover, and 
changes in ownership structure appear to be important factors 
affecting changes to boards.
Two important issues complicate empirical work on boards 
of directors, as well as most other empirical work on 
governance. First, almost all the variables of interest are 
endogenous. The usual problems of joint endogeneity 
therefore plague these studies. For instance, firm performance 
is both a result of the actions of previous directors and itself a 
factor that potentially influences the choice of subsequent 
directors. Studies of boards often neglect this issue and thus 
obtain results that are hard to interpret. 
Second, many empirical results on governance can be 
interpreted as either equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium 
phenomena. While it is generally difficult to distinguish 
between the two interpretations in a given study, they often 
have drastically different implications for policy. For example, 
one of the most consistent empirical relationships regarding 
boards of directors is that board size is negatively related to 
firm profitability. The out-of-equilibrium interpretation of this 
finding says that limits on board size should be encouraged, or 
perhaps even mandated. In contrast, the equilibrium 
interpretation of this result implies that some other factor is 
causing both board size and profitability, so that such regulation 
would be at best useless and possibly counterproductive. 
Exhibit 1 illustrates the two interpretations. Both endogeneity 
considerations and the equilibrium nature of the results should 
be carefully considered when evaluating any study of boards or 
any other aspect of corporate governance.
Despite these issues, much has been learned about boards of 
directors in public corporations in the past fifteen years. Yet 
there is still much work to be done. This literature has 
proceeded in the opposite direction of the scientific method 
archetype; the empirical literature on boards in public 
corporations is fairly well developed, while theory is still in its 
infancy. It is likely that subsequent developments in theory will 
lead to more sophisticated empirical analyses. In addition, the 
governance of organizations other than for-profit corporations 
is a relatively unexplored area. Both theoretical and empirical 
work aimed at understanding these organizations is likely to 
bear fruit in the near future.
Several caveats are in order. First, in surveying the literature 
on boards of directors, we emphasize the aspects we know best. 
We have tried to be fair to all authors, but nonetheless plead 
guilty to spending a disproportionate amount of time on our 
own work. We apologize if we have neglected a favorite paper or 
misinterpreted it. Second, boards of directors are an important 
topic of research in many areas, not just economics. Important 
research has been conducted from both managerial and legal 
perspectives; we have omitted discussion of these literatures 
entirely. Kosnik (1990), Zajac and Westphal (1994), and 
Rediker and Seth (1995) provide good introductions to the     FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 9
management literature on boards. From the legal literature, 
one particularly noteworthy study is Roe (1994). Finally, 
boards of directors are only one element of corporate 
governance systems; see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a 
broader survey of corporate governance. 
2. Conceptual Issues
As with so much of economics, Adam Smith (1776) appears to 
be the first economist to address boards of directors: 
The directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being 
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance [as owners] . . . . 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more of less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company (p. 700). 
One hundred and fifty-six years later, Berle and Means 
(1932) took a largely similar view: 
Control will tend to be in the hands of those who select 
the proxy committee and by whom, the election of 
directors for ensuing period will be made. Since the proxy 
committee is appointed by the existing management, the 
latter can virtually dictate their own successors (p. 87).
Both quotes point out the agency issues that have typically 
caught economists’ eyes. Until recently, however, economic 
theory was insufficiently developed to analyze such agency 
problems. But a “problem” these issues clearly seemed to be, 
and not only to economists. Much of the regulation of boards 
since Adam Smith’s day has been driven by a desire to solve this 
problem. Even today, the press regularly chides boards for 
being insufficiently vigilant guardians of other people’s money 
and being too much in management’s hands. Similarly, we still 
hear calls for “reforms.” For instance, the American Law 
Institute (1982), Lipton and Lorsch(1992), and Jensen (1993) 
have each made proposals that, if adopted, would impose 
restrictions on the workings of boards.
Yet one does not have to hold a Chicago Ph.D. to ask, if 
boards are so bad, why hasn’t the market caused them to 
improve, or even replaced the corporate form with less 
problematic forms of organization? Or, put differently, 
pointing out that an institution is not first-best efficient is not 
the same as demonstrating that outside regulation is needed. 
A reasonable possibility is that boards are the second-best-
efficient solution to the various agency problems confronting 
any organization with such a potentially large divergence in 
interests among its members. As a matter of economic theory, 
the conditions under which we could expect such regulation to 
be welfare-enhancing are rather limited (see, for example, 
Hermalin and Katz [1993]).
Perhaps, then, before we rush to regulate boards, we should 
step back and question what problems boards do solve. That is, 
why are there boards?
2.1 Why Are There Boards of Directors?
One potential answer to the question of why boards exist is that 
they are simply a product of regulation. Between state 
incorporation laws and the stock exchange governance 
requirements, most firms are required to have a board that 
meets a multitude of requirements: it must have at least so 
many members, it must meet with at least some specified 
regularity, it may need to have various committees, and some 
fraction of the directors may be obligated to have some 
nominal independence from management. 
Yet this cannot be the entire story. Governing boards are 
prevalent all over the world, in a variety of for-profit and 
nonprofit organizations; more importantly, the existence of 
governing boards predates these regulations. Furthermore, if 
boards existed simply to satisfy regulatory requirements, they 
would represent deadweight costs to firms, which subsequent 
lobbying presumably would have eliminated, at least 
somewhere in the world. In fact, the available evidence suggests 
the contrary: were boards a deadweight cost to the firm, we 
should expect them to all be at minimum size as fixed by 
regulation. Yet, in practice, boards are generally much larger 
than required by law.
Given their prevalence over time, across boundaries, and in 
different organizational forms, there must be an explanation 
for boards other than a regulatory-based one. A more plausible 
hypothesis is that boards are a market solution to an 
organizational design problem, an endogenously determined 
institution that helps to ameliorate the agency problems that 
plague any large organization. Whatever their virtues or 
problems, boards of directors are part of the market solution to 
the contracting problems inside most organizations. We 
believe that viewing boards of directors from this perspective is 
the most useful way to study how they are structured and function.
Our point of departure therefore is that a board of directors 
is the equilibrium solution (albeit possibly second best) to some 10 Boards of Directors
agency problems confronting the firm. But what agency 
problems do they solve? And why are boards the solution? 
The canonical agency problem exists between a firm’s 
owners, its shareholders (who are generally seen as unable to 
control management directly), and management (who, as 
Smith feared, tend to be insufficiently vigilant or trustworthy 
when it comes to other people’s property). One solution to this 
problem is to provide management with strong incentives 
contractually. But this begs the question of who provides these 
incentives and who ensures that the incentive contracts are 
structured optimally? In most large corporations, the 
shareholders are too diffuse, rationally plagued by a free-rider 
problem, and, for the same reason, too uninformed to set 
managers’ compensation.
This problem, as well as the underlying direct control 
problem, could be alleviated in situations in which a large 
outside shareholder has sufficient incentive herself to tackle 
them. Consequently, many models have explored the role of a 
large outside shareholder (see Shleifer and Vishny [1986], for 
example). While there are certainly instances in which large 
shareholders play an important governance role, this is also 
certainly not a universal solution.4 Moreover, the stage on 
which a large shareholder plays this role is often the board 
itself; that is, her power works through her position on the 
board or her control of some number of directors. Ultimately, 
the theoretical literature on boards will derive the board as part 
of the equilibrium solution to the contracting problem 
between diffuse shareholders and management.
One idea explaining why boards have emerged is that the 
directors’ mutual monitoring was critical for inducing 
shareholders to trust the directors with their money. For 
example, suppose that there were S shareholder dollars that 
potentially could be stolen, and that the penalty to a director 
(monetary, criminal, or reputational) was p, with S > p > 0. In 
addition, suppose that any director can costlessly prevent 
such theft. Then, N directors will “steal” if S/N > p. Clearly, 
there exists an N > 1 such that stealing is a strictly dominated 
strategy. In a similar vein, Meissner (2000) has explored the 
issue of how bank directors in early nineteenth-century
New England limited self-dealing. His argument is that the 
total amount of side payments a given director would have to 
make to his fellow directors to bribe them to approve a bad 
loan on his behalf would ultimately prove prohibitive vis-à-vis 
the gains the given director could expect. To be sure, these ideas 
are neither complete models, nor do they necessarily explain 
the continued existence of boards today.
2.2 How Are Boards Structured
and What Do They Do?
Even without a complete theory of why there are boards, we can 
still explore how boards are structured and what they do. 
Boards are generally made up of a mixture of insiders and 
outsiders; how is this mixture determined and what are the 
incentives of different directors? Conditional on composition, 
do boards function as they should? That is, is their performance 
optimal (at least in a second-best sense)?
One modeling approach is to see the board as the 
“principal” to management’s “agent” in a classic principal-
agent framework. Although such principal-agent modeling 
provides many insights, it is not particularly useful for 
explaining board-specific phenomena: for example, why the 
ratio of insiders to outsiders matters or changes, or why 
management seems to have such influence on the selection
of directors.
Outside directors are often thought to play the monitoring 
role inside boards. Yet their incentives are not clear. Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasize the fact that 
they have incentives to build reputations as expert monitors.5 
However, a reputation as a director who does not make trouble 
for CEOs is potentially valuable to the director as well. More-
over, as Holmstrom (1999) observes, wanting to be seen as 
doing the right thing and doing the right thing are not always 
the same. The incentives facing the outside directors that result 
from these divergent forces are an important underlying factor 
in many of the studies surveyed below. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) offer a more board-specific 
model. They focus on one of the primary board tasks: the hiring 
and firing of management. In their model, the board must 
decide whether to keep a CEO or to replace him. The firm’s 
performance provides a signal of the CEO’s ability, and the 
board may, if it chooses, obtain an additional, costly signal. The 
board’s inclination to obtain this signal is, in turn, a function of 
its independence from the CEO. A board’s independence 
depends on a bargaining game between the board and the CEO: 
the CEO prefers a less independent board, while the board 
prefers to maintain its independence. When the CEO has 
bargaining power—specifically, when the CEO has 
demonstrated that he is a “rare commodity” by performing 
exceptionally well—the board’s independence declines. 
Exhibit 2 illustrates the timing of the Hermalin-Weisbach 
model. Alternatively, poor firm performance reduces a CEO’s 
perceived ability relative to that of a potential replacement, 
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The Hermalin-Weisbach model derives a number of 
predictions about the dynamics of the CEO and board’s 
relationship. In particular, it predicts:
1. A CEO who performs poorly is more likely to be replaced 
than one who performs well.
2. CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when the 
board is more independent.
3. The probability of independent directors being added to 
the board rises following poor firm performance.
4. Board independence declines over the course of a CEO’s 
tenure.
5. Accounting measures of performance are better predictors 
of management turnover than stock price performance.
6. There should be long-term persistence in corporate 
governance.
7. The stock price reaction to management changes should 
be negative if the CEO is fired based on private 
information, but positive if the manager is fired on the 
basis of public information.
8. A CEO’s salary should be insensitive to past performance 
at relatively low levels of past performance, but sensitive at 
relatively high levels of past performance.
There is strong empirical evidence to support the first five 
predictions. For instance, Weisbach’s (1988) results are 
consistent with the first two predictions; Bhagat and Black 
(2000) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find results that are 
consistent with the third and fourth predictions; and, likewise, 
the fifth prediction is supported by numerous studies, of which 
Weisbach (1988) is one example. To the best of our knowledge, 
the last three predictions have not been empirically tested. 
There are other stylized facts about boards that do not, as of 
yet, arise as equilibria from formal models.6 Why, for instance, 
are directors reluctant to challenge the CEO (see, for example, 
Mace [1986])? Why does board size appear to affect perfor-
mance (Yermack 1996)? Why are boards an effective way of 
supplying information to management, as some suggest (see, 
for example, Mace [1986])? Finally, why are boards an effective 
way to groom future CEOs (Vancil 1987)? As the trend toward 
careful modeling of economic institutions continues, boards 
will prove fertile ground for future research.
3. Empirical Studies on Boards 
of Directors
In contrast to the relative paucity of theoretical work on 
boards, there is a large empirical literature on the subject. 
Excluding case-based studies (such as Mace [1986] and 
Vancil [1987]), this research can be broadly characterized
as estimating one or more of the equations in the
system:
(1)  at+s = φ ct + ε t 
(2)  pt+s = β at + η t 
(3)  ct+s = µpt + ξ t , 
where c denotes a characteristic or characteristics of the board 
(such as composition or size); a denotes an action (such as 
dismissal of the CEO); p denotes firm performance (such as 
profits); t indexes time (s ≥  0); φ , β , and µ are parameters (more 
accurately, function operators) to be estimated; and ε , η , and ξ  
denote the rest of the specification (plus errors). Typically, the 
entire system is not estimated simultaneously, so joint 
endogeneity is handled using lags (that is, s > 0) on the 
equation of interest. Observe, from the first two equations, that 
it is possible to study directly the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance; that is,
(4) pt+s = β (φ ct + ε t) + η t . 
A number of studies have directly estimated this 
equation. Indeed, such studies are more prevalent than 
studies of the component equations (this is especially true 
for the “middle” equation of performance as a function of 
board actions).7 Exhibit 3 offers a graphic illustration of 
these four equations.
Exhibit 2
Timing in the Hermalin-Weisbach Model
CEO’s initial performance
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3.1 The Board’s Influence on Corporate 
Performance
We begin by reviewing the literature that has estimated the 
“composite” equation, 4. Two board characteristics have been 
used as the independent variable: board composition (typically 
measured by the proportion of outside—nonmanagement—
directors on the board) and board size.
Board Composition and Corporate Performance
Probably the most widely discussed question regarding boards 
is, does having more outside directors increase corporate 
performance? A number of papers have addressed this question 
using several methods. The first method has been to examine 
contemporaneous correlations between accounting measures 
of performance and the proportion of outside directors on the 
board. MacAvoy et al. (1983), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Mehran (1995), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2000)
all report insignificant relationships between accounting 
performance measures and the fraction of outside directors on 
the board. A second approach, suggested by the work of Morck 
et al. (1988), is to use Tobin’s Q as a performance measure, the 
idea being that it reflects the “value added” of intangible factors 
such as governance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and 
Bhagat and Black (2000) use this approach and find, as with 
accounting performance measures, that there is no noticeable 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and Q. 
Finally, Bhagat and Black (2000) examine the effect of board 
composition on long-term stock market and accounting 
performance. Once again, they do not find any relationship 
between board composition and firm performance. Overall, 
there is little to suggest that board composition has any cross-
sectional relationship to firm performance.8 
An important issue to consider when evaluating these 
studies is the endogeneity of board composition. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) suggest that poor performance leads to 
increases in board independence. In a cross-section, this effect 
is likely to make firms with independent directors look worse, 
because this effect leads to more independent directors on 
firms with historically poor performance. Both Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2000) have attempted 
to correct for this effect using simultaneous-equation methods. 
In particular, these papers lagged performance as an 
instrument for current performance. Still, even correcting for 
endogeneity in this manner, there does not appear to be an 
empirical relationship between board composition and firm 
performance.
MacAvoy and Millstein (1999) argue that one reason why 
researchers have heretofore generally failed to detect a 
relationship between measures of board independence and 
firm performance is that they have used “old” data—that is, 
data that preceded boards taking an activist role. In their 
provocative study, MacAvoy and Millstein find evidence that 
CalPERS’ grading of board procedures—presumably, in part, 
a proxy for independence—is positively correlated with 
accounting-based measures of performance. Although 
MacAvoy and Millstein could be correct in their assertion that 
boards have gone from being “managerial rubber-stamps to 
active and independent monitors,” one needs to question how 
the “rubber-stamp” regime could have, as they seem to assert, 
lasted for all but the past ten years or so of the history of the 
corporate form. Because CalPERS’ grading of board 
procedures is recent, it is impossible to test directly the authors’ 
assertion about history by applying their procedure to the “old 
days” considered by other researchers. Even within their time 
frame, it would also be interesting to see whether their results 
hold up using a richer set of control (right-hand-side) variables 
than they employ (their right-hand side is limited to year, 
industry, and CalPERS grade).
The generally poor results obtainesd in estimating the 
“composite equation” are not surprising—errors from both 
underlying equations are present, so the signal-to-noise ratio is 
low. In particular, firm performance is a function of so many 
different factors that it is difficult to imagine that the effect of 
occasional board meetings, etc., would be detectable (especially 
as the case-study literature—Mace [1986]; Lorsch and MacIver 
[1989]—suggests that the vast majority of these meetings result 
in no significant actions).
Exhibit 3
The Joint-Endogeneity Problem Plaguing Work 
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A somewhat more successful approach has been to measure 
the impact on firm value of changes in board composition. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) examine the stock price reaction 
on the day of the announcement that outside directors will be 
added to the board. They find that on average there is a 
statistically significant 0.2 percent increase in stock prices in 
response to the announcement of these appointments. 
In many ways, the Rosenstein and Wyatt approach is a 
cleaner test of the relationship between board composition and 
ultimate value than the other studies considered above; the 
Rosenstein and Wyatt approach controls for all firm-specific 
effects and tests directly for the desired effect. Controlling for 
firm-specific effects is critical because—as Hermalin (1994) 
predicts and Kole (1997) and Hermalin and Wallace 
(forthcoming) confirm—there is no reason to imagine that a 
specific board composition (for example, percentage of 
outsiders) is optimal for all firms. Hence, the impact of board 
composition on performance could be difficult to identify 
cross-sectionally.
However, there is a potential drawback to the Rosenstein 
and Wyatt approach. Presumably, firms change their board 
structure to improve their operations and, thus, ultimately  
their value. Thus, all change announcements, to the extent that 
they are unexpected, should cause a positive change in the stock 
price. If this is true, then the Rosenstein and Wyatt results tell 
us nothing about the value of outsiders per se. Yet if only the 
addition of outsiders increased firm value, while other changes 
were neutral or lowered firm value, then we have to ask why 
this is allowed to happen and why firms do not continually add 
outsiders to boost value. In their follow-up paper, Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1997) address some of these concerns. Overall, they 
find no definitive effect of adding an insider to the board. In 
some specifications, however, they find that adding an insider 
increases the stock price. Hence, the original Rosenstein and 
Wyatt effect could, as we have suggested, simply reflect value 
increase associated with the change, rather than anything in 
particular about outsiders.
These questions highlight the difficulties encountered when 
interpreting the results from much of the empirical literature 
on boards. Specifically, either these papers are estimating 
equilibrium phenomena or they are estimating an out-of-
equilibrium situation (recall Exhibit 1 and the related 
discussion). If the equilibrium interpretation is correct, it is 
hard to explain how certain actions could consistently increase 
firm value. In contrast, if one believes the out-of-equilibrium 
interpretation, one must first address the issue of how the firms 
arrived at this out-of-equilibrium situation.
Board Size and Corporate Performance
Board composition notwithstanding, Jensen (1993) and Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards can be less effective 
than small boards. The idea is that when boards become too 
big, agency problems (such as director free-riding) increase 
within the board and the board becomes more symbolic and 
less a part of the management process. Yermack (1996) tests 
this view empirically and finds support for it. He examines the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and board size on a sample of 
large U.S. corporations, controlling for other variables that are 
likely to affect Q. Yermack’s results suggest that there is a 
significant negative relationship between board size and Q. 
Confirming the Yermack finding, Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
document that a similar pattern holds for a sample of small and 
midsize Finnish firms. The data therefore appear to reveal a 
fairly clear picture: board size and firm value are negatively 
correlated.
Another measure of the importance of board size is how 
participants in the marketplace view it. In a novel approach, 
Gertner and Kaplan (1996) examine the boards of a sample of 
reverse-leveraged buyouts. Their idea is that these firms are 
more likely than ongoing public firms to choose a “value-
maximizing” board. Gertner and Kaplan find that, in this 
sample, boards tend to be smaller than in otherwise similar 
firms. Wu (2000) considers the evolution of board size over the 
1991-95 period. She finds that board size decreased on average 
over this period and that the decrease can be explained at least 
partially by pressure from active investors such as CalPERS. 
Market participants seem to think that small boards do a better 
job of monitoring management than do large boards.
Although striking, these results nevertheless raise some 
questions. For instance, why, if they are destructive to firm 
value, do we see large boards? Perhaps large boards are 
uniformly bad because size exacerbates some free-riding 
problems among directors vis-à-vis the monitoring of 
management. But then why does the market permit them to 
exist—why hasn’t economic Darwinism eliminated this unfit 
organizational form? These questions raise the issue of whether 
an equilibrium phenomenon or an out-of-equilibrium 
situation is being estimated—that is, are we on the left or right 
side of Exhibit 1? And if we are on the right side, what is the 
“other factor”? Sorting out the appropriate interpretation of 
these results on board size and corporate performance seems 
like a particularly useful topic for future research.14 Boards of Directors
3.2 Boards of Directors and Particular Tasks
In addition to studying the relationship between board 
characteristics and firm performance, a number of studies have 
examined how boards accomplish some of the responsibilities 
commonly assigned to directors. In terms of our heuristic 
system of equations, these studies can be thought of as 
estimates of actions, a; as a function of characteristics, c
(that is, estimating equation 1). 
This approach has several advantages relative to looking at 
the effect of boards on overall firm value. First, there are many 
factors affecting performance. Hence, this approach is 
potentially more powerful because it is less prone to 
unobservable factors contaminating the statistical relationship. 
Second, when examining particular tasks of directors, it is less 
likely that the endogeneity of board composition will affect the 
results. In general, this type of test is much cleaner than the 
tests relating composition to firm performance. 
CEO Turnover
The most commonly discussed responsibility of the board is to 
choose and monitor the firm’s CEO (see Mace [1986], for 
example). Indeed, rather than make day-to-day decisions, 
directors appear to play a crucial role in picking the firm’s CEO 
and, as suggested by Mace (1986) and Vancil (1987), to view 
their primary responsibility as monitoring and potentially 
replacing him. Therefore, one way to evaluate the board’s 
effectiveness is to look at the quality of these decisions.
A large number of papers have documented a positive 
relationship between CEO turnover and poor performance in 
large corporations as well as in other types of organizations.9
In addition, Denis and Denis (1995) document that firm 
performance generally improves following a CEO turnover, 
especially a forced turnover. The standard interpretation of this 
relationship is that it measures the board’s monitoring ability; 
when performance is poor, the board is more likely to find the 
current CEO unacceptable and make a change. 
An important issue in all of these studies is the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary turnovers, which is usually 
difficult to make and, in some cases, impossible. Studies take 
different approaches to dealing with the issues of voluntary 
turnover: some ignore the issue, some exclude observations 
pertaining to CEOs at retirement age, and some make a 
detailed effort to distinguish forced departures from voluntary 
turnovers. Nonetheless, voluntary turnovers are unlikely to be 
related to performance, and the negative relationship between 
performance and CEO turnover is extremely robust across 
samples. Therefore, the measured negative relationship 
between turnover and performance probably reflects boards 
firing CEOs (that is, the difficulty in distinguishing the two 
types of turnover merely adds noise to the dependent variable 
and thus is irrelevant beyond its impact on the standard 
errors).
Simply documenting a relationship between poor 
performance and an increased probability of a CEO turnover, 
although suggestive of board monitoring, is nonetheless far 
from conclusive. After all, a sense of failure or pressure from 
outside shareholders could explain this relationship. To better 
identify the role played by the board, Weisbach (1988) interacts 
board composition and firm performance in a CEO turnover 
equation. His results indicate that when boards are dominated 
by outside directors, CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm 
performance than it is in firms with insider-dominated boards. 
This result holds when firm performance is measured either by 
market-adjusted stock returns or by an accounting measure of 
performance. This result is consistent with the view that 
outsider-dominated boards—those a priori likely to be 
independent of management—are responding to corporate 
performance when they make CEO retention decisions.
In contrast, turnover in insider-dominated boards is not 
performance-driven, suggesting that insider-dominated 
boards make turnover decisions for reasons unrelated to 
corporate performance.
The most plausible interpretation of this finding is that 
boards controlled by outside directors do a better job of 
monitoring the CEO than do boards controlled by inside 
directors. However, a possible alternative explanation is that 
inside directors make their turnover decisions on the basis of 
inside information. Since by definition this information is not 
known to market participants, it will not be incorporated into 
the stock price. This interpretation implies that even though 
insider-dominated boards are responding to performance, the 
performance they are responding to is not measurable by an 
outside observer. A point against the inside-information 
explanation is that such information is likely to be correlated 
with measurable performance (at least ex post), suggesting that 
CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards would still be 
somewhat responsive to measured performance. 
In addition, there is a theoretical reason to favor the 
monitoring explanation over the asymmetric information 
explanation. Inside directors’ careers tend to be tied to the 
CEO’s, which gives them incentives to advance the CEO’s 
career regardless of the stock price. Moreover, any potential 
inside information that inside directors use to justify a firing 
has to reflect negatively on the CEO without reflecting 
negatively on them; otherwise, shareholders would likely 
respond to the CEO’s dismissal by demanding a clean sweep of 
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Borokhovich et al. (1996) and Huson et al. (2000), who find 
that outsider-dominated boards are more likely than insider-
dominated boards to replace a CEO with someone from 
outside the firm.10 
Yermack (1996) and Wu (2000) perform a similar analysis 
of CEO turnover, measuring the impact of board size on the 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. 
These papers estimate similar equations to Weisbach’s (1988), 
except that they substitute an interaction of the log of board 
size with firm performance for Weisbach’s interaction of board 
composition with firm performance. Both Yermack and Wu 
find a positive and significant coefficient on this interaction 
term, which indicates that firms with smaller boards have a 
stronger relationship between firm performance and CEO 
turnover than firms with larger boards. This finding is 
consistent with the view that smaller boards are more effective 
overseers of the CEO than larger boards. In particular, in 
response to poor performance, they may not be paralyzed by 
free-riding or otherwise plagued with inertia in the way that 
larger boards are. It is also possible that smaller boards are 
more effective at obtaining inside information that ultimately 
will be reflected in measured performance. However, this 
analysis begs the now familiar question of whether we are 
observing an equilibrium or a disequilibrium phenomenon; or, 
put differently, could we ever observe firms with boards that 
are “too small,” rather than just “too large”?
Perry (2000) breaks down the cross-sectional relationship 
between CEO turnover and firm performance by whether the 
outside directors are paid using incentives. He finds that the 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance is 
stronger when boards have incentives. This finding suggests 
that providing explicit incentives to directors leads them to 
make better decisions. It is also consistent with the view that 
outside directors who receive incentive pay tend to have a 
professional rather than a personal relationship with the CEO 
and thus are relatively more independent.
The key issue in interpreting these studies is whether the 
relationships they uncover are causal. In other words, do the 
particular attributes of the board—such as composition, size, 
or compensation—directly affect the board’s monitoring? 
Or might boards that are independent for other reasons tend 
to have certain characteristics and therefore monitor more 
effectively? Reality is sufficiently complex that neither question 
can receive a simple yes or no answer. Yet because a board 
dominated by a CEO will not monitor regardless of its visible 
characteristics, we suspect that the second question is more 
often the one deserving an affirmative answer. That is, we tend 
to see independence as the true causal variable, with size, 
compensation, and board composition as correlates. A board 
made up of directors who wish to be independent of 
management will prefer to be paid with incentives and to 
arrange themselves, in terms of size and composition, in a way 
that best facilitates oversight of management.
Evidence from the Takeover Market
The active takeover market of recent years has provided a 
laboratory for studying the actions of boards and for evaluating 
the relative merits of different kinds of directors. Shivdasani 
(1993) uses the takeover market as a means to study boards and 
their role in corporate governance. He estimates the probability 
of a firm being taken over by a hostile bidder during the 
takeover wave of the 1980s.  This is a sensible approach because 
boards potentially affect takeover probabilities in two ways. 
First, boards can affect the quality of governance and hence 
influence the desirability of a firm as a target. Second, they can 
affect the takeover process itself by controlling the ease with 
which a bidder can acquire the firm.
Arguably, Shivdasani’s most interesting finding is that when 
outside directors have more additional directorships, it is less 
likely that the firm will be acquired in a hostile takeover. There 
are three potential interpretations of this finding. Higher 
quality directors could do a better job and hence be asked to sit 
on more boards. In addition, by doing a good job as directors, 
they reduce the likelihood of their firms’ becoming takeover 
targets. Alternatively, directors in higher demand will turn 
down directorship opportunities at poorly managed firms, 
which are more prone to being acquired. A third, less 
charitable, interpretation is that outside directors who hold 
many directorships do so because they have established a 
reputation for supporting management and not “rocking the 
boat.” A firm in which the directors will likely support 
management poses a tough fight for hostile bidders and 
therefore is a less desirable acquisition target.
In addition, Shivdasani finds that who controls board seats 
appears to affect the takeover process. The dominance of board 
seats by management and affiliated blockholders decreases the 
probability of a hostile bid, while significant board seat 
holdings by unaffiliated blockholders increases it. Overall, the 
paper suggests that boards affect takeover probabilities by 
influencing both the quality of the company’s management 
and the process of a takeover.
In a paper complementing the Shivdasani study, Cotter, 
Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) analyze the effect of governance 
on the cross-sectional distribution of target firms’ abnormal 
returns during the tender offer process. Cotter et al. find that 
when a target’s board contains a majority of outside directors, 
the target receives a return approximately 20 percentage points 
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directors on the board. This finding suggests that, conditional 
on a firm being acquired, outside directors do a better job of 
negotiating on behalf of shareholders than do insiders. 
Together, the two papers suggest that the board composition of 
a potential target is an important factor in the takeover process.
Understanding the reaction of boards to takeover bids 
ultimately requires understanding the incentives of the 
directors. Harford (2000) documents that directors, in 
particular, outside directors, have pecuniary incentives to resist 
the takeover bid. Following an acquisition, target directors 
generally lose their seats on the board and the associated 
directorship incomes. Harford finds that they make up some of 
the financial loss through gains on the equity they hold in the 
firm. However, on average, the gain on the equity is too small 
to compensate the directors for the loss of directorship income. 
Therefore, Harford concludes that, at the margin, financial 
considerations will lead outside directors in the direction of 
resisting possible acquisitions that are in the shareholders’ 
interest. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) analyze the role of boards of 
acquiring companies. They measure the stock price reaction to 
these firms when an acquisition is announced. Across all firms, 
they find an average abnormal drop in the acquirer’s stock 
price of 1.33 percent over the two days surrounding the 
announcement of the acquisition. Byrd and Hickman then 
divide the sample according to whether the firms have 
boards with more than 50 percent independent directors. 
The subsample of firms in which at least 50 percent of the 
directors are independent exhibits a very small stock price 
drop of 0.07 percent, while the other subsample, containing 
a minority of independent directors, has a larger stock price fall 
of 1.86 percent. These two abnormal returns are significantly 
different from each other at the 5 percent significance level. 
This finding indicates that the market perceives firms with 
independent boards as making better acquisitions (or at least 
fewer bad ones).
Poison Pills
Brickley et al. (1994) analyze the impact of the board on the 
decision to adopt a poison pill. As a matter of corporate finance 
theory, the impact of adopting a poison pill on firm value is 
ambiguous. Pills can serve to protect current management at 
the expense of shareholders, but they can also serve to increase 
the firm’s (shareholders’) bargaining position in the face of a 
potential takeover. Brickley et al. find that the stock market 
reaction to poison pills is positive when the board has a 
majority of independent directors and negative when it does 
not. This result suggests that firms with a majority of outside 
directors—that is, with presumably more independent 
directors—adopt pills to further shareholders’ interests, while 
firms with insider- (management-) dominated boards use 
them as a means of entrenching management at the 
shareholders’ expense. 
Executive Compensation
Another role of the board is to set and oversee the firm’s 
policies for compensating management. A view, prevalent 
since at least Berle and Means (1932), is that CEOs exert 
control or influence over their boards to extract “excessive” 
levels of compensation. To examine this view, Core et al. 
(1999) study the relationships among board composition, 
ownership structure, and CEO pay. Their results suggest that 
firms with weaker governance structures tend to pay their 
CEOs more. Specifically, they find that CEO pay rises with the 
number of outsiders appointed during the CEO’s tenure, and 
about whose appointments the CEO therefore had a say. CEO 
pay also rises with variables likely to indicate a lack of board 
involvement: board size, the number of directors over age 
sixty-nine, and the number of “busy” directors, where busy is 
defined in terms of the number of additional directorships held 
by a director. 
However, Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) model predicts 
that a successful CEO—one who has improved his bargaining 
position by proving he is a rare commodity—can successfully 
bargain both for less board scrutiny and greater compensation. 
That is, the empirical link between an inattentive board and 
CEO compensation, which, in a Berle and Means view, is seen 
as causal, may in fact be spurious: both may be the consequence 
of a successful CEO exercising his bargaining position (or, 
correspondingly, an unsuccessful CEO incurring the cost of a 
reduced bargaining position). Exhibit 1 illustrates this issue 
(here the other factor is the CEO’s previous performance, 
which allows him to bargain both for less board scrutiny—the 
board characteristic—and greater compensation—the “other” 
firm attribute).
In addition, both Core et al. (1999) and Hallock (1997) find 
that CEO pay at a given company increases when the given 
company’s board contains directors who are CEOs of firms on 
whose boards the CEO of the given company sits (that is, when 
boards are “interlocking”). One interpretation is that there is a 
quid pro quo between such directors and the CEO, which leads 
to greater compensation. Again, one cannot dismiss the 
interpretation, in line with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) 
model, that the CEO of the given company is very successful 
and thus has sufficient bargaining power to get both higher 
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because of the leverage over them that the CEO enjoys by 
sitting on their boards).
 Finally, Yermack (1996) finds that the pay-performance 
relationship for CEOs decreases with board size, suggesting 
that small boards give CEOs larger incentives and force them to 
bear more risk than do large boards.
Summary 
In this section, we have examined empirical studies that look 
more directly at what boards do. More precisely, we have 
reviewed studies that look at the statistical relationship between 
what boards do and their observable characteristics (studies that 
estimate some operationalization of equation 1 above). In 
contrast to performance studies (those that estimate some 
version of equation 4 above), these studies of board actions have 
generally found significant results. In particular, these studies 
appear to indicate that board characteristics are important. Both 
board composition and size appear to affect the quality of 
decisions on CEO replacement, responses to a hostile takeover, 
adoption of a poison pill, and the design of CEO compensation 
schemes. As we noted, however, the plausible possibility of 
spurious correlation makes accepting the obvious causal 
interpretation questionable for some of these studies.
Why have those who have estimated some variation of 
equation 1 found statistically significant results when those 
estimating equation 4 have generally found none? One 
potential answer has to do with the varying roles played by the 
board. In particular, board independence might not matter 
enough on a day-to-day basis for one to find significant 
relationships between measures of director independence and 
firm performance when estimating equation 4. Board 
independence does, however, matter for certain board actions, 
particularly those that occur infrequently or only in a crisis 
situation. In contrast, board activity—especially free-riding 
among directors, which board size might capture—could be 
important both for specific actions and overall firm performance. 
3.3 Factors That Affect the Board’s Makeup 
The final set of studies we review focuses on the factors 
affecting the composition of the board—that is, equation 3 
from the system described above. Knowing the factors that 
affect board composition is clearly an important step in 
understanding boards and their role in corporate
governance.
Perhaps the most natural way to examine board 
composition is to look cross-sectionally at the firm-level factors 
associated with different kinds of boards. However, cross-
sectional analysis of boards is limited because of endogeneity 
issues; any variable associated cross-sectionally with board 
composition is likely to be jointly determined with board 
composition. Despite this issue, cross-sectional correlations 
appear to be robust across samples and have been reported by 
a number of papers, including Weisbach (1988), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), and Denis and Sarin (1999). It appears that 
tightly held firms—in which the founders are still active and 
the CEO has a large ownership position—tend to have insider-
dominated boards. In contrast, larger and older firms are more 
likely to have professional management with small ownership 
stakes and outsider-dominated boards.11
Board Dynamics
Because of the potential for joint-endogeneity problems, work 
on the determinants of board composition has focused on the 
dynamics of composition. That is, the impact of changes in a 
firm’s characteristics or performance on subsequent changes in 
board composition is examined. Looking at changes in this 
fashion minimizes the potential for joint-endogeneity 
problems because of timing considerations; all that is required 
to avoid simultaneous-equations bias is for firm-level variables 
to not be affected by subsequent changes to the board.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) take this approach and 
estimate the factors that lead to changes in corporate boards. 
They find that three kinds of factors are statistically related to 
changes in the board. First, poor firm performance increases the 
likelihood that inside directors will leave the board and outside 
directors will join. Second, the CEO succession process appears 
to be intertwined with the board-selection process. When a 
CEO nears retirement, firms tend to add inside directors, who 
are potential candidates to be the next CEO. Just after a CEO 
change, inside directors tend to leave the board, consistent with 
the hypothesis that these directors are losing candidates to be 
CEO. Finally, Hermalin and Weisbach document that after a 
firm leaves a product market, inside directors tend to depart the 
board and outside directors tend to join.
Denis and Sarin (1999) confirm these findings on a much 
larger sample of firms from a nonoverlapping time period. 
They find that large changes in board composition tend to 
occur after abnormally poor performance and around the time 
of a CEO change. They also find that the dynamics of 
ownership structure and board structure appear to be related in 
an important way: the “derivative” of the proportion of 
outsiders on the board with respect to CEO stock ownership is 
negative. One potential explanation is that as the CEO changes 
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shareholders changes, which affects the power he has over 
board composition. Another possible explanation is that 
because changes in his ownership alter the alignment of the 
CEO’s incentives with those of other shareholders, the 
importance of outside monitoring changes as the CEO’s 
shareholdings change.12
Gilson (1990) examines the effect of bankruptcy on 
corporate boards. He finds that following a bankruptcy or 
private restructuring, banks take an active role in the firm’s 
governance, including appointing a number of directors. 
Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
perform related studies of Japanese companies and the role of 
banks in their governance. These papers find that following 
poor performance, banks take a more active role in the firms’ 
governance, including appointing a number of directors to the 
board. These studies are consistent with the view that creditors 
play a role in governance, which increases when firm 
performance lags and debtholders’ claims become more 
uncertain.
Board Composition and the Power Struggle 
between the Board and the CEO
Probably the most important factor determining a board’s 
effectiveness is its independence from the CEO. Independence 
from the CEO’s influence is the underlying factor in many 
discussions of boards and their relationship with management. 
However, this variable is fundamentally unobservable, and this 
unobservability is an important reason why empirical work on 
boards of directors is a challenging topic. A number of recent 
papers have addressed the power struggle between the board 
and CEO empirically in creative ways.
Hallock (1997, 1999) examines board interlocks, which 
occur when a firm’s employee sits on another firm’s board and 
that firm’s employee sits on the first firm’s board. These 
employees are generally the CEO or another person high in 
management in their respective firms. Given this type of 
relationship, the potential for collusive or quid pro quo 
behavior on the part of the “interlocked” directors is 
particularly high. Hallock documents that the prevalence of 
interlocking directorships is too high to be explained by 
random chance. In addition, he finds that CEOs with 
interlocking boards get paid more than otherwise similar 
CEOs. These findings are consistent with the view that 
interlocking directorships provide the CEO a degree of control 
over his board or, at the very least, that the CEO has the 
bargaining power to obtain a friendly board.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine the extent to 
which the CEO is involved in the board-selection process. This 
is an interesting empirical exercise because case-study 
evidence suggests that CEOs play an important role in 
selecting new board members (Mace 1986; Lorsch and 
MacIver 1989) and because theoretical work implies that the 
role of the CEO in choosing directors can have an impact on 
the board’s effectiveness (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). 
Shivdasani and Yermack construct a measure of CEO 
involvement in the selection process based on whether the 
board has a separate nominating committee, and conditional 
on such a committee existing, whether the CEO is on it. The 
authors find that this measure of CEO involvement decreases 
the firm’s subsequent number of independent directors. 
Shivdasani and Yermack’s results are consistent with the view 
that, at least in some firms, the CEO is able to use his control 
over the selection process to decrease the board’s independence.
Baker and Gompers (2000) examine the board-selection 
process in a large sample of initial public offerings. They test 
whether factors that are plausibly related to CEO bargaining 
power influence the selection of board members. In particular, 
they argue that CEO tenure and CEO voting stake, as 
measured by its Shapley value, are likely to be positively related 
to CEO bargaining power.13  In contrast, the presence of a 
venture capital investor, especially one with a strong 
reputation, is likely to decrease the CEO’s bargaining power 
relative to the board. Empirically, Baker and Gompers find 
that, consistent with the bargaining framework, CEO tenure 
and CEO Shapley value are positively related to the number of 
insiders on the board, while the number of insiders decreases 
with the reputation of the venture capitalist financing the firm.
Overall, the literature has documented a number of facts 
about board dynamics. These facts can be explained reasonably 
well by a bargaining framework such as Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998). Interested parties’ control of the board appears to be a 
function of their bargaining power. When banks’ financial 
claims become more uncertain and their legal rights in 
bankruptcy courts therefore become stronger, their 
representation on boards increases (Gilson 1990; Kaplan and 
Minton 1994; Morck and Nakamura 1999). After a period of 
good performance, when a CEO’s perceived value relative to a 
potential replacement is likely to be high, he is able to add more 
insiders to the board (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Denis and 
Sarin 1999). Finally, direct measures of a CEO’s bargaining 
position—such as his voting stake, the use of interlocks, his 
representation on the nominating committee, and his dealings 
with venture capitalists—appear to affect board composition in 
ways consistent with the bargaining framework (Hallock 1997, 
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3.4 Studies of Boards Focusing
on Particular Industries
Most of the literature on boards of directors has relied on 
samples of public industrial companies. This focus is natural 
given the visibility and importance of such companies. 
However, the diversity of firms in such studies adds 
heterogeneity and potential noise to the issues being addressed. 
A number of studies have avoided this problem by focusing on 
one particular industry or organizational form. This subsection 
surveys this work and its implications for governance more 
broadly.
The Money Management Industry
Two recent papers have examined boards of directors in the 
money management industry. Tufano and Sevick (1997) 
consider a sample of open-end mutual funds while Dann et al. 
(2000) examine the role of the board in closed-end invest-
ment companies. Open-end and closed-end funds differ 
organizationally, but both types of organizations seek to 
maximize their funds’ returns. Clearly, maximizing returns 
implies negotiating as good a deal as possible with the portfolio 
managers. Both Tufano and Sevick and Dann et al. use this logic 
to focus on the relationship between boards and expense ratios. 
Both papers find that when boards are made up of independent 
directors, fees tend to be lower. Both papers also find that 
expenses are increasing with board size. These results are 
consistent with the literature on industrial corporations, 
suggesting that board size and composition are correlated with 
board effectiveness.
Organizations with Prohibitions on Takeovers
Two studies have used organizational restrictions on takeovers 
as a way of examining whether boards substitute for an external 
control market. Brickley and James (1987) construct a sample of 
banks, some of which are allowed by state law to be taken over 
and some of which are from states that prohibit acquisitions of 
banks. Mayers et al. (1997) compare stock and mutual 
insurance companies for the same reason, since stock 
companies can be acquired but mutuals cannot. Each of the 
papers measures the impact of these regulatory requirements on 
board composition; the idea is to test whether internal and 
external control mechanisms are substitutes. The two papers 
arrive at conflicting results: Brickley and James find that banks 
from states with takeover restrictions have fewer outside 
directors than banks from other states (contrary to the 
substitution hypothesis), while Mayers et al. find that mutual 
insurance companies employ more outside directors than do 
stock insurance companies (consistent with the substitution 
hypothesis).
Hospitals
An important difference between for-profit firms and other 
organizations exists in the organization’s objective function. 
For-profit firms attempt to maximize the present value of 
economic profits; in contrast, a nonprofit’s objective function 
is an endogenous choice not clearly specified by economic 
theory. This difference has implications for governance: while 
the governance of a for-profit aids in the goal of profit 
maximization, governance of a nonprofit must both choose the 
objective function and decide how best to maximize it. 
Understanding these issues in nonprofit governance in general 
seems like an important topic for both economic theorists and 
empiricists. Two papers—Brickley and Van Horn (2000) and 
Eldenburg et al. (2000)—have taken a first step in this direction, 
using samples of hospitals. Hospitals are a useful setting for 
studying the relationship between organizational form and 
governance because they exist simultaneously as different types of 
organizations but perform the same basic services. 
Brickley and Van Horn estimate the relationship between 
CEO turnover and hospital performance and between CEO pay 
and hospital performance on samples of for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. They find that both relationships are 
similar for the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Consequently, 
they cannot reject the hypothesis that nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals maximize different objective functions. Eldenburg 
et al. perform a similar experiment, looking at CEO and board 
turnover across a number of classes of hospitals, including for-
profit, nonprofit, government, and religious. They find that 
both board turnover and CEO turnover increase with poor 
hospital performance, high administrative costs, and high 
levels of uncompensated care. The sensitivity of turnover to 
these factors varies across hospital types. These findings are 
consistent with the view that different types of hospitals 
maximize different objective functions. 
4. Conclusions
Boards of directors are an integral part of the governance
of large organizations, including all corporate and many 
noncorporate organizations. Therefore, they have attracted 20 Boards of Directors
considerable attention from scholars in economics and finance. 
In this paper, we have surveyed this research and its impli-
cations for governance.
Boards of directors are an institution that has arisen 
endogenously in response to the agency problems inherent in 
governing any organization. Formal theory on boards of 
directors has been quite limited to this point. Instead, the 
literature has developed as a series of empirical studies 
generally aimed at answering one of three questions:
1. How are board characteristics such as composition
or size related to profitability?
2. How do board characteristics affect the observable
actions of the board?
3. What factors affect the makeup of boards and board 
evolution over time?
Several key findings have been derived from the empirical 
literature on boards. Notably, board composition is not related 
to corporate performance, while board size is negatively related 
to corporate performance. In addition, both board 
composition and size do appear to be related to the quality of 
the board’s decisions on CEO replacement, acquisitions, 
poison pills, and executive compensation. Finally, boards 
appear to evolve over time as a function of the bargaining 
position of the CEO relative to that of the existing directors. 
Firm performance, CEO turnover, and changes in ownership 
structure appear to be important factors affecting changes to 
boards.
Most research on boards begins with the assumption that 
the directors’ effectiveness is a function of the board’s 
independence from management. The unobservability of the 
board’s independence, together with endogeneity issues, 
conspires to make empirical work on boards a challenge—
first, because of the econometric issues raised, and second, 
because of the resulting difficulties of interpretation. Two 
characteristics of boards—their size and composition—are 
conceivably correlated with a board’s independence. A number 
of studies have found that these characteristics are associated 
with boards that take better actions from the shareholders’ 
perspective. However, lacking an adequate interpretation of 
these results (Are they equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium 
results? Evidence of causation or spurious correlation?), we are 
reluctant to recommend policy changes on the basis of these 
studies.
All of this highlights the importance of better modeling of 
boards and their functions. This too is a difficult task, however. 
First, there is an important dynamic element to the board-CEO 
relationship that is missing from most principal-agent models. 
In this relationship, the “principal’s” preferences change over 
time because changes in board membership mean the board 
becomes more or less favorably disposed to the CEO (among 
other possible changes in preferences). A second, and related, 
issue is that unlike standard agency models, the agent has some 
say over who his principal is. These aspects of the board-CEO 
relationship complicate the modeling problem in ways that 
have yet to be resolved.
Even if one were to resolve these modeling issues, one would 
still be open to the complaint that the board is being modeled as 
a monolithic entity. In reality, a board consists of individuals 
who are unlikely to share a common agenda on all matters. For 
instance, after a proxy fight, directors hostile to management 
are sometimes added to a board that is otherwise friendly with 
management. But less dramatic and more common examples 
also exist. Because each board member bears 100 percent of the 
cost of her effort to monitor the CEO while enjoying only a 
fraction of the benefit, we should expect a free-rider problem 
among the directors. In addition, a CEO can potentially act 
strategically by playing one faction or group of directors against 
another. 
Addressing these issues requires modeling the board’s inner 
workings. But once we treat the board as consisting of 
individuals, we face tremendous challenges in applying our 
standard game-theory modeling strategies to the problem. We 
are not even assured that these are the appropriate modeling 
strategies. Experimental and other evidence is increasingly 
casting doubt on the appropriateness of game theory to explain 
the behavior of small groups of individuals because individuals 
appear to be governed more by issues of emotion, fairness, and 
norm adherence than is consistent with standard economic 
models (see Hermalin [2001] for a partial survey of some of 
these issues). When these issues are addressed, we will have a 
more coherent model of the board and a better understanding 
of its role in governance.
Thus, while significant progress has been made in the past 
fifteen years, there is much more work to be done. To this point, 
the literature has documented a number of facts and empirical 
relationships, most of which are for large, publicly traded 
companies. Formal theory has been limited, in large part 
because of the modeling issues involved. We expect that in the 
near future, research on boards will focus on three main areas:
1. Models of the inner workings of boards.
2. Tests of the implications of particular models, rather than 
the “Are Outside Directors Good or Bad?” studies that we 
have seen so much of to this point.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 21
3. Studies of boards of organizations other than large pub-
licly traded corporations. Of particular importance are 
small entrepreneurial firms and nonprofit organizations.
We note that a number of the recent papers surveyed above 
have followed one or more of these approaches. It is likely that 
subsequent work along these lines will add much to our 
understanding of boards and of governance in general.Endnotes
22 Boards of Directors
1. For an innovative way to assess independence—or board 
activism—see MacAvoy and Millstein (1999), who use CalPERS’ 
grading of board procedures as a measure.
2. Most directors can be classified as inside directors or outside 
directors. Inside directors are employees or former employees of the 
firm. They generally are not thought to be independent of the CEO, 
since the success of their careers is often tied to the CEO’s success. 
Outside directors are not employees of the firm and usually do not 
have any business ties to the firm aside from their directorship. 
Outside directors are typically CEOs from other firms or prominent 
individuals in other fields. Finally, about 10 percent of directors do not 
fall into either category; often these are attorneys or businesspeople 
that have a long-standing relationship with the firm. These directors 
are usually referred to as “affiliated” or “gray” directors.
3. Here and throughout this paper, “firm performance” will be a 
convenient phrase meant to capture various possible measures of firm 
success (for example, return to investors, profitability, successful 
execution of firm strategy). In many of the empirical studies we 
review, firm performance has been operationalized in a precise way 
(for example, stock return or performance on some accounting 
measure). In the more limited theoretical literature, firm performance 
has typically meant economic profits in static models or firm value—
the present discounted value of economic profits—in dynamic models.
4. As their holdings have grown, institutions have played a much 
more active role in monitoring management governance in recent 
years. See Karpoff (1998) or Carleton et al. (1998) for discussion of 
shareholder activism and recent evidence on large institutional 
shareholders’ efforts to change corporate governance.
5. See Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Farrell and Whidbee 
(forthcoming) for evidence on the reputation argument.
6. Some other models that concern boards of directors are Adams 
(1998), Almazan and Suarez (2000), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994), 
Raheja (2001), and Warther (1998).
7. Most of this literature focuses on the monitoring of boards of 
directors. Of course, boards do other things as well inside of firms. For 
an interesting discussion of the political role played by some directors, 
see Agrawal and Knoeber (forthcoming).
8. One exception is Baysinger and Butler (1985), who find that the 
1970 proportion of independent directors is positively related to 1980 
return on equity.  However, as Bhagat and Black (1999) emphasize, 
these authors use only a single performance measure, and ten years 
seems like an implausibly long time over which to observe 
performance improvements from a factor such as board
composition.
9. Among them are Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, 
and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
Barro and Barro (1990), Blackwell et al. (1994), Kaplan (1994), 
Brickley and Van Horn (2000), Eldenburg et al. (2000), and Huson 
et al. (2000).
10. A third explanation is that board composition is a function of the 
quality of executives just below the CEO. When there are high-quality 
inside alternatives to the CEO, these executives will be more likely to 
be directors, leading to more inside directors on average. In addition, 
they will tend to replace the CEO for reasons that might not be related 
to publicly available measures of performance, and it will be more 
likely in these firms that the replacement CEO will be an insider, 
consistent with Borokhovich et al. (1996) and Huson et al. (2000).
11. One cross-sectional study not subject to the endogeneity critique 
is Kroszner and Strahan (forthcoming). They find that stable firms 
with collateralizable assets are more likely to have bankers on their 
boards, potentially allowing for better monitoring of bank lending 
activities.
12. However, because the CEO’s shareholdings in his own company 
are generally a disproportionate part of his portfolio, his attitude 
toward company risk is likely to differ from that of more diversified 
shareholders. That is, although increased CEO shareholdings may 
better align his incentives with those of shareholders on some 
dimensions, they may misalign them with respect to attitudes
toward risk.
13. From cooperative game theory, the Shapley value to a player is 
that player’s payoff, which equals his or her expected marginal 
contribution to a random coalition of players. In the context of 
dividing a pie, the Shapley value concept can be seen as the extension 
of the Nash bargaining solution concept to games with more than two 
players. See Hart (1987) or Myerson (1991) for details.References
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